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Fitzgerald: Montana's Constitutionally Established Investment Program: A State Investing Against Itself

MONTANA'S CONSTITUTIONALLY
ESTABLISHED INVESTMENT PROGRAM:
A State Investing Against Itself*
Wendy A. Fitzgerald**
Montana's 1889 Constitution contained dozens of sections detailing an extremely conservative scheme for the investment of
Montana's public funds.' The 1972 Constitutional Convention replaced the 1889 provisions with a single section unifying the investment of all Montana trust funds under a single state agency.
The convention's Revenue and Finance Committee majority report
provided no more than legislative supervision of investments and
the unified program. The minority report also endorsed unifying
state investments, but advocated retaining from the 1889 Constitution a prohibition on investment in corporate common stock for all
but state retirement trust funds. The minority prevailed on the
convention floor, and its plan-still vastly simplified from the 1889
version-now governs the investment of Montana's more than 2.6
billion dollars in various trust funds.2 That provision reads in pertinent part:
The legislature shall provide for a unified investment program for
public funds and provide rules therefor, including supervision of
investment of surplus funds of all counties, cities, towns, and
other local government entities ....

Except for monies contrib-

uted to retirement funds, no public funds shall be invested in private corporate capital stock.'
* The author thanks the University of Montana School of Law and the MONTANA LAW
for organizing Constitutional Symposium '89 at which she presented this article.
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The author extends special thanks to Judge Gordon Bennett, Conference Coordinator, and
Mae Nan Ellingson, Finance Panel moderator, for their assistance in preparing the author
for participation in the Symposium, and to Lawrence Turk and Daniel Kemmis for the
background information they provided for this article. Finally, the author thanks the editors
and staff of the MONTANA LAW REVIEW for their assistance in preparing this article for publication. Any errors or omissions, however, are the author's alone.
** B.A., Reed College, (1978); M.A., University of Virginia, (1980); J.D., University of
Montana, (1989); Law Clerk, The Honorable Thomas Tang, Circuit Judge, United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, arts. XI, XII, XXI; Montana Constitutional Convention
Commission, Montana ConstitutionalConvention Occasional Papers, Report No. 5, Comparison of the Montana Constitution with the Constitutions of Selected Other States
(1971) [hereinafter Comparison of the Montana Constitution] for a compilation of the 1889
trust fund and investment provisions.
2. STATE OF MONTANA BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, 1987-1988 FIscAL YEAR REP. 1 (1988)
[hereinafter BOARD OF INVESTMENTS].
3. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 13.
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This constitutional provision commands our attention because 2.6
billion dollars in investment funds has vast potential for good or
for ill.
The convention debate over the two proposals synthesized several strains of Montana's character and history. In this article I
examine the major historical influences on the convention's deliberations; by turn, progressivism, populism, and conservatism. I
then contrast the delegates' vision for state investment with its actual implementation. Although the convention approved a plan of
public accountability, instate investment, and preventing state
conflicts of interest, the actual program has failed to realize these
hopes. At fault, however, is perhaps not our constitution, but a
failure of our confidence as a people to control the use of our state
capital resources.
I.

PROGRESSIVE INFLUENCES

Montana's progressive political tradition grew from the "progressive era" in American history spanning the turn of the century.4 Slum housing, malnutrition, poverty, child labor, and exploitive working conditions blighted the national landscape.
Reformers of the era identified unresponsive government and the
massing of wealth and power in business trusts and monopolies as
the roots of these social evils.' Indeed, big business controlled
many aspects of local, state, and national government through the
firm grip of corruption.7 Government, reformers believed, could not
even moderate the ill effects of industrialization until government
was returned to the people.8 The chief tenet of progressive political
reform, therefore, was to restructure government to shield it from
corruption and to grant sway to the popular will. In state and local
politics, progressives across the nation achieved such lasting reforms as centralization, the popular election of senators, and public
regulation of utilities.'

In Montana, progressives waged a bitter struggle against the
chokehold the Anaconda Company maintained on Montana state
government, press, and labor.10 In 1920, the progressive Joseph M.
4.

S. MORRISON,

AMERICAN REPUBLIC

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

H.

COMMAGER &

W.

499 (1977) [hereinafter

LEUCHTENBURG,

A

CONCISE HISTORY OF THE

MORRISON].

Id. at 499-509.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 508-10.

10. See K.R.
(1972) [hereinafter

TOOLE, TWENTIETH CENTURY MONTANA: A STATE OF EXTREMES
TOOLE].
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Dixon won a divisive campaign for the governor's office and attempted to implement many of the reforms other states had
achieved. In his State of the State address to the 1921 Legislature,
Dixon proposed sweeping tax reforms and legislative--reapportionment designed to loosen Anaconda Company's hold on the state."
Through several of Dixon's proposals, such as centralizing state
purchasing, appointing an independent and professional state
Board of Equalization, and streamlining state bureaucracy, Dixon
hoped to restructure government itself to insulate it from the
Company's influence and to assure democratic control.1" Labelling
Dixon a "radical" and a "liar," the Company's lobbyists discredited Dixon and easily defeated his reforms. 13 Montana's era of progressivism ended, and little changed in Montana government for
the next several decades."
The history of the state's investment programs reflects the
consistent defeat of progressive reform in Montana until the 1970s.
From 1924 through 1971, by constitutional amendments, legislative
efforts, and finally executive directive, progressives strove to centralize and to regulate the administration and investment of Montana's many trust funds."5 A growing and disjointed state bureaucracy comprised of 188 different agencies, each jealously guarding
its autonomy, had frustrated these efforts.16 By 1969, eighteen different boards or commissions administered Montana trust funds,
employing different and virtually unregulated accounting methods
and strategies." The Constitutional Convention Commission reported to the 1972 Revenue and Finance Committee, "Of the
thirty-three accounts invested, a yield was reported for only four;
the state had no idea what kind of total return it was making on its
investments.' 8
By the 1972 Constitutional Convention, however, progressivism had resurfaced in Montana. On the national scene, progressives railed against state bureaucracy as incomprehensibly big and
shamefully inefficient.' 9 Echoing their progressive ancestors, the
11. Id. at 255-58.
12. Id. at 257-58.
13. Id. at 264.
14. Id. at 271.
15. R. Barber, Montana Constitutional Convention Studies: Report No. 15, Taxation
and Finance 237-38 (1971) [hereinafter Barber].
16. J. LOPACH, WE THE PEOPLE OF MONTANA ... THE WORKINGS OF A POPULAR GOVERNMENT 115-16, 176-78 (J. Lopach ed. 1983) [hereinafter WE THE PEOPLE]; Barber, supra note
15, at 237.
17. BARBER, supra note 15, at 238-39.
18. Id. at 239.
19. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 16, at 174-76.
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reformers of the 1960s and 1970s advocated the restructuring of
government to eradicate corruption and incompetence and to assure responsiveness to people's needs and desires. In forty-one
states, progressives achieved some form of government reorganization during these decades. 0 In Montana, the 1969 Legislature appointed an executive reorganization commission, which reported
that "the executive branch has grown into a cumbersome, fragmented and haphazard collection of autonomous agencies ...
Comprehensive reorganization ...

is necessary to insure that gov-

ernment will be maintained in an efficient and responsive manner." 2 ' Concerned not only for efficiency, but also for public participation in government, the commission advocated reform because
"it [was] impossible for the electorate to meaningfully fix definitive
and true responsibility anywhere for the administration of governmental affairs."22 Responding to the commission report, by constitutional amendment in 1970 and legislative and executive order
in
23
1971, Montana completely overhauled its state bureaucracy.
The 1971 reforms streamlined state government and strengthened the governor's authority over the executive branch.24 The reforms included consolidating the administration and investment of
all state funds under a single Board of Investments.2" Like Dixon's
progressive proposal for an independent and professional Board of
Equalization free of corruption and incompetence, the law mandating the new Board of Investments required gubernatorial appointment, so members would be "informed and experienced in the field
of investments.

26

Although the legislature had finally accomplished these progressive reforms a year before the constitutional convention met,
the delegates feared a return to Montana's past history of an unconstrained state bureaucracy and unregulated investment program. Delegates forcefully described on the convention floor the
inefficiencies, and indeed irresponsibility, found in the past administration of state trust funds.2 7 When the Chairman introduced the
Revenue and Finance Committee's majority report, therefore, he
argued for conferring constitutional certainty on the recent re20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 116, 177-78.
Id. at 177-78.
Barber, supra note 15, at 237.
Id.
V MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 1529 (1981) [hereinafter

TRANSCRIPTS].
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forms. Said Delegate Rygg, "The Committee feels the importance
of unity, professional treatment and supervision of all public fund
investments should be stressed at the constitutional level."28
Constitutional establishment of a unified state investment
program was but one aspect of the convention's progressive efforts
to reform permanently the state bureaucracy. Other constitutional
provisions, for example, limited bureaucratic growth to twenty executive departments," placed the executive branch firmly under
the governor's control,30 and assured public participation in executive agency decision-making." In these provisions too, the convention gave constitutional importance to recently enacted progressive
reforms of the state bureaucracy. These constitutional revisions,
like the unified investment program mandate, reflected the progressive desire to achieve professional and efficient management of
state government.
Because of the seeming daunting complexity of the financial
world, professional management of state investments struck some
delegates to the convention as particularly important. Several of
the delegates expressed their personal mystification about investments and their desire to entrust state funds to financial experts.3 2
Of the twenty or so delegates who spoke on the investment proposal, several rose just to ask questions, and many qualified their remarks by disparaging their financial knowledge.3 3 The Chairman of
the Revenue and Finance Committee himself seemed to sum up
many of the delegates' attitudes when he explained why he had
participated so little in the debate. "I recognize when I have talent," Delegate Rygg said, "and I yield to the affluent man and the
banker when it comes to talking about investments. We listened
for hours to the Investment Board; we feel [the trust funds are] in
'3
good hands.
In part to assure that professional expertise would guide Montana's investment strategy, the majority report of the Revenue and
Finance Committee recommended abolishing the investment
prohibitions of the 1889 Constitution in favor of legislative supervision.3 5 The committee had learned that although other states'
constitutions included mild investment restrictions, Montana's
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1516-17.
MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 8.

V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1522, 1523, 1529-30.
Id. at 1523.
Id. at 1530.
Id. at 1518.
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1889 Constitution was the only attempt to prescribe constitutionally a specific investment program." The committee had learned
further that wherever the 1889 Constitution had locked state funds
into government bonds, for example, yields had suffered from in37
flation and missed opportunities in other investment vehicles.
Calling the 1889 investment structure "obsolete" and citing examples of sister states with five times the rate of return Montana had
enjoyed, delegates urged permitting the legislature to establish an
investment program administered by financial experts." Explained
Delegate Heliker, "[W]e do not have the picture before us of the
Legislature sitting down and actually doing this investment itself.
It will turn the job over to experts. And it seems to me that this is
the way it should be handled and that we should not try to freeze
[any investment restrictions] into the Constitution. ' 3
No one challenged unifying state investment funds constitutionally, the chief progressive contribution to the proposed provision. The proposal to free all investment funds from constitutional
restrictions and to submit those funds to legislative supervision,
however, sparked controversy. The convention ultimately adopted
the committee's minority proposal to prevent the investment of all
but pension funds in corporate common stock.4 0 That constitutional restriction defeated the progressive move to permit total
flexibility in state investment. The opponents of flexibility did not
represent special interests as had the foes of progressive ideas in
Montana's past. Rather, the debate over restricting state investment turned on delegates' attitudes toward two other forces in
Montana's history, populism and Montanans' struggle to eke a living from this land.
II.

POPULIST INFLUENCES

The majority's proposal to abolish constitutional restrictions
on investment and to permit legislative establishment of investment programs forwarded the progressive principle of government
accountability to the people. Advocates of the majority report
echoed this populist strain of progressivism when they argued that
36. See generally Comparison of the Montana Constitution, supra note 1; Barber,
supra note 15, at 252.
37. Barber, supra note 15, at 240-54.
38. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1517, 1528.
39. Id. at 1526.
40. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 13. The convention concluded that state employees
ought to decide for themselves whether to invest their retirement funds in common stock. V
TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1529, 1537.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/10

6

Fitzgerald: Montana's Constitutionally Established Investment Program: A State Investing Against Itself

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

a legislature accountable to the people of Montana should determine how to invest their public funds. Remarked Delegate Joyce:
I am willing to trust the people of Montana who they'll elect to
the Legislature. If they elect people to the Legislature that are
crooks, we can turn back the course of history and we can resurrect the vigilante committees and hang some people from the
Capitol dome.... But I'm not afraid of the future or afraid of the
people of Montana, and I submit the progressive majority report.
41

The convention debate, then, turned to who should control the
state's capital resources: the experts, the legislators, the people, or
the constitution. While progressives had long fought for the popular control of government, populists had long fought for the control
of capital. Indeed, the convention debate on control of state capital
recalled to some delegates Montana's populist history.
Political populism arose on the national scene in the agricultural west after the American Civil War. Grangers and Farmers'
Alliance members learned to overcome economic hardship through
cooperatively owned enterprises such as grain elevators and reaper
factories. 42 By 1890, the Farmers' Alliances had spawned a platform and candidates to carry their political message.4 3 These populists advocated the substitution of government for bank control of
currency, a graduated income tax, public ownership of utilities and
railroads, and public financing for farmers." The populist movement remained a national minority, but was a creative influeice in
5
American politics until World War II.1
In Montana, populism never grew as strong as in North Dakota, for example, where the movement achieved a state bank. In
1914, however, Montana voters passed a ballot initiative dedicating
a portion of the constitutionally established School Land Trust
Fund for investment in first mortgages in Montana farms. 46 Although the impetus for "Farm Loan Law" may have been the
homesteading boosterism of the pre-drought years, the law nonetheless was populist in placing the capital of the people under the
control of the people for the benefit of the people. Between 1917
and 1933, the program eventually extended over four million dol41. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1530.
42. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 434.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 437.
Id. at 437-39.
Id. at 439.
Toole County Irrigation Dist. v. State, 104 Mont. 420, 432, 67 P.2d 989, 992 (1937).
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lars in loans to Montana farmers.4 7
Politically, Montana populism reached its zenith in 1920 when
the state's populist Non-Partisan League grew to 20,000 members.4 8 Angry farmers filled these ranks after three years of devastating drought, over a hundred agricultural bank closures, and a
failed state bond program to employ drought-stricken farmers
building county roads.4 9 Free of the strong-arm tactics the Anaconda Company used to intimidate labor, the farmers of the NonPartisan League openly challenged the state's taxation policies,
which impoverished counties and enriched the Company. 50 The
Non-Partisan League backed Jeannette Rankin's successful congressional bid, but its support of Burton K. Wheeler's failed gubernatorial campaign against the more moderate Dixon marked the
end of the League's political influence in Montana.5 1 The Company
press excoriated Wheeler as "Bolshevist Burt" for his Non-Partisan League ties and painted the contest between Dixon and
Wheeler as "a matter of freedom versus Socialist slavery. '52 The
anti-socialist hysteria that eventually crushed the populists politically in Montana was the vanguard of the early "red scare"
53
nationally.
The Depression dealt the death blow to the populist Farm
Loan program. By 1935, the program had lost every penny of the
more than four million dollars loaned54 as Montana farmers suffered their second decade of dustbowl-creating drought. The exodus of Montana homesteaders continued. 5 Bound by the 1889 constitutional provision declaring the School Land Trust Fund
"inviolate," the 1935 Legislature acknowledged the state's responsibility for the lost funds."' The legislature began a repayment program from taxes of all the principal and interest lost in the disaster. 57 It was not until 1953 that the School Land Trust Fund
finally recouped all the funds lost in the Farm Loan program. 8
No delegate to the 1972 Constitutional Convention argued
47. Id. at 432-38, 67 P.2d at 992-94; V TRANSCRI-rS, supra note 27, at 1540.
48. TOOLE, supra note 10, at 241.
49. Id. at 241.
50. Id. at 241-42.
51. Id. at 235, 238-48.
52. Id. at 247.
53. Montana's repressive Sedition Law became the model for national legislation in
1918. Id. at 155.
54. Toole County Irrigation Dist. v. State, 104 Mont. 420, 437, 67 P.2d 989, 994 (1937).
55. See TOOLE, supra note 10, at 80-81.
56. Toole County Irrigation Dist., 104 Mont. at 437-38, 67 P.2d at 994.
57. Id. at 438, 67 P.2d at 994.
58. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1540.
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openly or consciously for popular control of state investment capital, but supporters of the minority proposal to prohibit investment
in common stock nonetheless advanced populist themes. When
Delegate Artz introduced the minority report on the floor, he
presented it as a constitutional scheme for investment priorities:
"[Niumber one, security; number two, that the funds should be
invested in Montana as much as possible; and that the final consideration is the return on the investment .... [K]eep the money
in Montana."5'9 Delegate Artz thus stressed security of trust fund
principal as the first priority, but made investment of public capital within the state a higher priority than profit. Like his populist
predecessors, Delegate Artz sought to secure public capital for the
benefit of the people through investment in Montana enterprises.
Delegate Artz further proposed that the constitution prohibit investment in common stock so that the legislature would not face a
conflict of interest by serving as both a shareholder in and regulator of Montana industries.6 0
The debate then turned to the wisdom of freezing an investment plan into the constitution. Some delegates expressed the progressive version of populism by supporting supervision of state investments by the legislature. 1 The minority proposal, expressed
populism at its most fundamental by attempting to assure popular
control of and popular benefit from state capital in the state's organic law.
Proponents of the majority proposal repeatedly stressed the
ability of expert financiers to increase state funds in the stock market. 62 Delegates rising in support of the minority report, however,
expressed a kind of populist distrust of experts and legislators
both. None felt constrained to qualify his or her remarks with
apologies for lack of financial expertise. Rather, they seemed to assume that ordinary citizens were competent to make investment
decisions, indeed were perhaps more competent than experts or
legislators. Time and again the proponents of the minority report
cited historical examples of experts' costly folly-tulip bulb investments, real estate speculation, and the 1929 crash-and their fear
that experts could "pressure" the legislature into such risky ventures unless a constitutional ban prevented them. 3 Again Delegate
Artz summed up the case against experts when he observed:
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1519 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1519-20.
See, e.g., id. at 1525, 1529-30.
Id. at 1525, 1528-30.
Id. at 1519, 1522, 1531, 1532-33, 1534-35.
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Mr. Drum said we could get good investment counsel and that
that would insure us that we wouldn't lose any money in the
stock market. Now, I've put some money in mutual funds, and
they supposedly have real good investment counsel; they have
computers and analyze the market and the whole thing. But look
at their record, even the best of them. Some of them barely kept
up with the Dow-Jones, and some of them went broke."
Distrust of the touted experts and faith in their own commonsense ability to design a state investment program to benefit
Montanans were populist sentiments the minority report advocates
unwittingly expressed.
The convention's adoption of the minority proposal was
clearly an endorsement of the populist instate investment scheme
Delegate Artz had outlined. The language of the minority report
failed to express this intent, however, and thus accomplished no
more than prohibiting the investment of all but state pension
funds in common stock. 5 To the extent that the delegates expressed approval of using Montana state capital for Montanans
and exercised their own popular control rather than leaving investment decisions to the experts, however, the convention reflected
and affirmed Montanans' historical populist character. Other provisions in the 1972 Constitution indeed manifested the convention's populist viewpoint. Provisions for popular sovereignty, the
right to know and to participate in government processes, direct
democracy through ballot initiatives, and the mandate for periodic
review of the constitution itself all reflected Montana's populist
spirit. 6
III.

THE INFLUENCE OF CONSERVATISM AND THE LAND

The decisive arguments in the convention debate over the majority and minority proposals expressed telling attitudes toward
holding a legacy of funds in trust for future generations and Montana's experience with an economy dependent on resource extraction. Proponents of the majority report spoke of their belief in an
expanding American economy that would realize great returns in
the future if the state could but seize opportunities in flexible investment strategies.6 Delegate Drum voiced these sentiments in
patriotic tones when he concluded:
64.
65.

66.
67.

Id. at 1537.
MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 13.
WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 16, at 10-11.
V TRANSCRUPrS, supra note 27, at 1525, 1529-30.
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But I think it really all boils down to this: the American system of
private enterprise ain't too bad. It's a growing economy. There
may be losers, and there are a lot of winners. But if we have faith
in that economy and are willing to allow our people [via the legislature] to make the decision of whether they want to participate
in the growth of the American economy, I think this Constitution
should allow them that latitude."
Delegate Drum's words epitomize the "frontier optimism" that
propelled early pioneers into the western wilderness and still characterizes Americans as expansive, fast-paced, "go-ahead" people."9
More persuasive to the convention delegates, however, was
Montana's own history of economic "boom and bust." Supporters
of the minority report argued that a constitutional prohibition on
common stock investment might slow growth, but it would also
protect state trust funds from the kind of disastrous losses the
state had experienced throughout its history. 70 Delegates repeatedly referred to the "homestead boom collapse" of the 1920s and
1930s, which forced the state to repay School Land Trust Fund
principal loaned under the Farm Loan Program.7 ' Indeed, over the
decades since statehood each of Montana's resource-based industries-agriculture, mining, and timber-had raised Montanans'
hopes high during the booms, only to dash them and Montanans'
standard of living during the busts.72 Shortly before the constitutional convention met, the University of Montana's Bureau of Business Research issued the first comprehensive study of Montana's
economy, revealing per capita income fourteen percent below the
national average, a projection of a further seven percent decline by
1980, and the conclusion that the state was "economically stagnant. ' 73 Delegates painting a rosy economic future of growing investment funds could not overcome the hard-learned pessimism of
most.
Rather than risk trust funds in flexible investments, most delegates voiced the simple desire to preserve and protect them. Responding to criticism of the slow growth of Montana trust funds,
Delegate Romney said, "I want to be sure that we don't lose anything. I'm not so concerned about gaining as I am keeping what we
have .... And that is why we must scrupulously guard this inheri68.
69.
70.
35, 1537,
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1530.
R. BILLINGTON, AMERICA'S FRONTIER HERITAGE 225-26 (1974).
V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1519, 1522-23, 1524, 1527, 1531, 1532-33, 15341539-40.
Id. at 1534, 1539-40.
TOOLE, supra note 10, at 284-85.
Id. at 282.
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tance. . . .'", Delegate Romney's words captured a predominant
theme of the constitutional convention and of Montana public discourse since. One author in the newly published Montana literary
anthology has observed:
Innocence and self-destructiveness converge in today's Big Sky
country with its awareness of being the end of a tradition, the last
best place .... Having lost so much, how can we keep the little
that is left? This the unspoken fear behind public policy debate
in Montana, from concerns about protecting the wilderness, the
water, and the air to promoting free enterprise, economic development, trade, and growth."5
Delegates to the 1972 convention were keenly aware of how
much Montana had lost from its resource extraction economy. Although boosters promised great returns from the investment of
Montana's resources-be they financial or natural-Montana's experience is that of steady depletion. 76 Travelling to the convention
across a state scarred by sod busting, clear cutting, and strip mining, the delegates arrived determined to preserve what was left of
Montana's natural legacy. When debating investment of Montana
trust funds, then, the delegates seemed to equate the funds with
the land itself. Though the School Land Trust is but a part of
Montana's investment pool, delegates often referred to that fund
as representative of the whole. "I'm sure glad that we didn't sell
that school section that [we were] going to get the great amount of
money on," replied Delegate Mahoney to promises of greater returns on investments. Supporting the minority proposal, he continued, "And, thank goodness, we had farsighted people that wasn't
looking for the dollar and getting that; that they says, 'We'll just
hang on.' "7 The delegates saw themselves as heirs of Montana's
mountains, streams, plains, and trust funds. Their first concern,
then, was to "just hang on," to pass these resources to future generations undiminished if also unincreased. The constitutional provisions for reclamation and protection of the environment and natural resources 78 could serve equally to represent the convention's
attitude about Montana trust funds. As Delegate Artz said in introducing the minority proposal, the first priority was to secure the
74. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1524-25.
75. Blew, FrontierDreams, in THE LAST BEST PLACE: A
Kittredge & A. Smith ed. 1988)
76. TOOLE, supra note 10,
77. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra
78. MONT. CONST. art. IX,

MONTANA ANTHOLOGY

633 (W.

(emphasis in original).

at 281-82.
note 27, at 1534 (emphasis added).
§§ 1, 2.
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principal, and the second was to "keep the money in Montana."7 9
Montana's history, the delegates recalled, was of continually
compromising its natural and human resources for economic gain.
Fear of perpetuating that cycle furthered the minority proposal to
ban investment in common stock. Without such a ban, Delegate
Artz reasoned, under the minority scheme for instate investment,
the state would own stock in Montana corporations." The possibility then arose that Montana would own stock in a company for
which the state had also required air-pollution controls. Playing
the role of company spokesperson, Delegate Artz challenged the
convention, "'Now here, listen here, fellows, we cannot go ahead
and put in all of this necessary equipment to keep those fumes
down; if we do, you're not going to get any return on your investment.' What position would that put the Legislature in?"'" In approving the minority proposal banning investment in common
stock, the convention thus hoped to prevent testing the legislature
with a devil's choice between profits for state trust funds and further degradation of Montana's lands. When faced with such a
devil's choice in the past, Montana often had selected the profits,
countenancing the scarred landscape only to see the profits ultimately flee the state anyway.82
IV.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ESTABLISHED
INVESTMENT PROGRAM

For the convention delegates, Montana's history had shaped
its new constitutionally established investment program. Progressive elements had achieved a program accountable to the public
and safe from corruption, centralized under the government's administrative arm. Populist elements had prioritized state investments so that Montana's capital resources would benefit
Montanans. Further, the people retained ultimate control of their
capital through their constitution. Finally, the conservative elements prevailed to hold Montana's funds in trust for future generations, preventing difficult choices between tempting gains and risk
to the principal and the land itself. In part because the actual provision they wrote failed to express the convention's investment
scheme, however, the delegates' vision has foundered.
First, the convention specifically rejected arguments favoring
expert control of investments so increased growth might provide
79.
80.
81.
82.

V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1519.
Id. at 1519-20.
Id. at 1520.
See TOOLE, supra note 10, at 281-82, 287-88.
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tax relief.8 3 Instead, the convention sought first to secure investment funds and second to invest them in Montana. Given the final
wording of the constitutional investment provision, however, the
legislature has implemented the very program the convention rejected. A joint interim subcommittee reported to the 1985 Legislature, "Maximum enhancement of earnings . . . is the objective of
the investment program because every dollar earned for state
gov'a4
ernment is one that taxpayers will not have to contribute.
Second, the convention specifically rejected expert control of
state investment funds because it doubted experts' ability to invest
those funds both safely and for the benefit of Montana. The legislature, however, has assured "expert" control of Montana investments by imposing the "prudent expert standard" on the investment of state funds.8 5 The prudent expert standard seems
innocuous enough, requiring that the Board of Investments act
with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" of a prudent expert.86 The prudent expert standard, however, imposes on Montana investment strategies both the perspective of a Wall Street
financier and the narrow investment criteria of securing the principal and maximizing returns. The standard thus thwarts the vision
of the 1972 convention in three critical areas: public accountability,
instate investment, and conflicts of interest.
A.

Public Accountability

Centralization of state investment programs now makes it possible for Montanans to know where and how their state funds are
invested, but the "prudent expert" standard frustrates the power
of that knowledge. In theory, the constitutional right to know
dovetails with another guarantee, the right of Montanans to participate "in the operation of the agencies prior to the final decision
....
" No citizen can meaningfully participate in Board of Investments operations and decisions, however, as long as the Board
must heed only its expert counsel.
In October of 1985, for example, the Board of Investments
agreed to meet with the Montana Peace Legislative Coalition to
hear its proposal for divestment of state funds from companies do83. Delegate Drum, advocate for the losing majority report, outlined the same investment plan the legislature now pursues. TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 27, at 1529-30.
84. JOINT INTERIM SUBCOMMITTEE No. 3, EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF STATE INVESTMENTS: A REPORT TO THE 49TH LEGISLATURE 8 (Dec. 1984).
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-201 (1989).
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-201 (1989).
87. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 8.
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ing business in South Africa. 88 Before the meeting, the Board consulted its experts and heard that divestment might "transgress the
prudent expert rule."8 9 The Board therefore voted on a resolution
prior to meeting with the Coalition not to divest state funds from
South Africa.9 0 When Coalition members objected to the Board's
deciding the issue before hearing their presentation, the Board
granted them another hearing."' After that hearing, the Board readopted its previous resolution. The Coalition members then unsuccessfully sued the Board for violation of their constitutional
rights to know and participate.92
The Coalition's experience illustrates the futility of exercising
constitutional rights to participate in investment decisions governed solely by the prudent expert standard. Under that standard,
the Board of Investments not only need not, but also must not
respond to citizens' concerns, and instead must respond only to the
prudent expert. The standard is thus anti-democratic, removing
investment decisions from public debate and consigning them to
nonpersuadable experts. The convention delegates rejected the
rule of financial experts over state investment programs. Legislative implementation of the constitutional investment provision-including the statutory prudent expert standard-has insulated the state investment agency from meaningful public
participation, however.
B. Instate Investment
The minority proposal that the convention finally adopted
also spelled out investment priorities first to secure the principal of
state trusts, second to invest in Montana, and only last to achieve
return on investments. The constitutional provision itself, however,
failed to reflect these priorities. Eleven years of legislative struggles
passed before an overwhelmingly popular ballot initiative in 1983
established an instate investment program. 3 Meanwhile, the dictates of the national capital markets, heeded by the prudent experts, had always deprived Montana businesses of necessary
capital.94
88. Montana Peace Legislative Coalition v. Reber, No. CDV-85-1214, Op. and Order at
3 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. Mar. 3, 1986).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The right to know and the right of participation are found within Montana's
Declaration of Rights at MONT. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 8 respectively.
93. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 17-6-301 to -331 (1989).
94. See TOOLE, supra note 10, at 286-87.
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Indeed, the prudent expert standard still functions to keep
most of Montana's money out of Montana. The 1983 initiative
earmarked but twenty-five percent of one trust, the Coal Tax
Trust Fund, for instate investment.9 5 As of 1988, therefore, Montana had invested only 163 million of its 2.6 billion dollars in public funds within its borders.96 The Board of Investments devoted
the vast majority of the 163 million dollars invested instate to providing a secondary market for Montana home mortgages. 7 Small,
indigenous Montana businesses qualifying under the instate investment initiative received less than eight million dollars in state
loan commitments.9 8 Only abrogation of the prudent expert standard in the legislation enabling instate investment made the capital available to Montana businesses at all.9"
Montana's resource extraction economy, long at the mercy of
national and international swings,100 compels a more concerted instate investment program, as the convention delegates realized. Big
businesses hardly require Montana's comparatively paltry state
capital resources, and Montana cannot hope to compete with other
states in the nationwide "race to the bottom" in providing lures for
big business relocation here.101 Montana can, however, provide
badly needed capital and other support to its own small businesses, small businesses which in fact employ most Montanans.
Recalling the disaster of the School Land Trust Fund Farm Loan
program, Delegate Artz insisted that Montana's trust principal remain secure. A concern for security has not deprived Montana
small businesses of capital resources, however. Rather, the prudent
expert standard's requirement for maximizing profits keeps Montana capital from Montana use. Were the legislature to abide the
convention's investment scheme, it would redefine return on investments as strengthening Montana's home-grown economy.
C.

Conflicts of Interest

The convention delegates hoped that a constitutional limit
permitting investment only in fixed yield bonds would prevent a
state conflict of interest between ownership in and regulation of
95.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-305 (1989).

96.

BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, supra note 2, at 2.

97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 2, 7.

99.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-309 (1989).

100. See TOOLE, supra note 10, at 286-87.
101. See Note, Problem With State Aid to New or Expanding Businesses, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1029 (1985).
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corporations operating in Montana. Of course, the constitutional
safeguard does not apply to investment of state retirement funds,
which comprise over fifty percent of Montana capital assets. 1 2
Moreover, although the limit frees the rest of Montana trust funds
from threats of immediate loss of yield from a security should state
regulation adversely affect the issuing corporation's earnings, it
fails to prevent Montana from investing against its own interests.
Whether the state invests in stocks or bonds, Montana investments
represent significant state financial support for those corporations
chosen for investment'0 3 and Montana investments help further
those corporation's policies. Montana invests against its own interests, for example, when it on the one hand espouses certain environmental or human rights policies and on the other invests in any
corporation regardless of the corporation's environmental or
human rights practices. The prudent expert standard, blind as it is
to every investment criteria except security and maximizing returns, now results in "facially neutral" and hence socially unscrupulous investment strategies. Three examples illustrate this result,
but analysis of Montana's investment portfolio undoubtedly would
reveal other socially questionable investment decisions.
First, in 1982 Montana voters passed a ballot initiative declaring their opposition to "any further testing, development, or deployment of nuclear weapons by any nation."'0 4 Although the people of Montana established firm state policy against nuclear
weapons testing, development, and deployment, the Board of Investments followed only its prudent expert standard. By 1985,
then, Montana had invested 73 million dollars in nuclear weapons
manufacturers." 5 To invest in nuclear weapons manufacturers robs
substance from the people's declared opposition to nuclear weapons testing, development, and deployment. The Montana Peace
Legislative Coalition therefore supported a bill in the 1985 Legislature to divest from Montana's portfolio twenty-six nuclear weapons manufacturer holdings then comprising about five percent of
the portfolio. 0 ' The Board of Investments lobbied heavily against
0 7
the bill, arguing it contravened the prudent expert standard.
102. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, supra note 2, at 13.
103. See Huber v. Groff, 171 Mont. 442, 558 P.2d 1124 (1976) for discussion broaching
though not specifically addressing this concern.

104.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 90-5-211 (1989).

105. Hearings on H.B. 645, 49th Leg. (Testimony of B. Turk Feb. 15, 1985) [hereinafter Turk].
106. H.B. 645, 49th Leg. (1985) (sponsor of the Bill Mike Kadas); Turk, supra note
105.
107. See Fiscal Note to H.B. 645, 49th Leg. (1985).
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The Board of Investments prevailed, and so it remains seemingly
free to thwart Montana's antinuclear policy through its investment
strategies.108
The Board of Investments' arguments before the 1985 Legislature betrayed more of a concern for agency autonomy-that innate
attribute of bureaucracy the progressive 1972 Constitution had attempted to curb-than for sound financial management. As the
Coalition pointed out, nuclear weapons divestment would have diminished potential diversification by eliminating only 250 of the
6,350 companies listed on major American securities exchanges. 10 9
Moreover, while the Board of Investments complained of the
transaction expenses associated with selling the twenty-six holdings in controversy, its own annual report revealed that in three
months the Board had conducted as many transactions as the divestment bill would have required over three years.1 10 Finally, the
Board could advance scant evidence to suggest that divestment
from nuclear weapons manufacturers would diminish returns.
Rather, the experience of other states' and cities' socially responsible investment programs showed no adverse effects on portfolio
earnings."' It appears, then, that the Board of Investments raised
the prudent expert standard as a shield against public involvement
in its decisions rather than as a sound financial principle on which
to oppose divestment.
Even had the Board shown that divestment contravened the
prudent expert standard by diminishing portfolio earnings, under
the 1972 Constitution it remains a legislative prerogative to sacrifice the potential for earnings in favor of implementing other state
policies. The convention itself clearly rejected maximizing returns
as the overriding criterion for investment decisions. Rather, after
assuring the safety of the principal, the most important criterion
for convention delegates was the advancement of state policies
such as Montana economic growth and pollution control.
Second, overriding constitutional concerns should have compelled divestment from South Africa regardless of the possible
breach of the prudent expert standard. The 1972 Constitution absolutely prohibits discrimination on the basis of race." 2 The Board
of Investments could not comply with this constitutional prohibi108. Note that Montana also has invested in nuclear-energy utilities although state
policy forbids the development of nuclear energy in Montana.
109. Turk, supra note 105, at 1 and studies cited therein.
110. Id. at 2.
111. See id. at 3 and studies cited therein.
112. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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tion and yet grant Montana financial support to companies operating in the South African apartheid system. Nonetheless, and as in
the case of nuclear weapons, the Board of Investments argued that
the prudent expert standard precluded divestment from South Africa."' As of 1985, Montana had 228 million dollars, about ten percent of its trust assets, invested in companies doing business in
South Africa."'
As in the case of nuclear weapons divestment, convincing financial evidence refuted Board of Investment arguments and
showed that divestment, if anything, might strengthen the safety
of Montana's investment portfolio."' Indeed, Montana's financial
implication in apartheid has declined as corporations voluntarily
ceased their South African operations.1 6 Even were divestment to
result in diminished returns, however, fidelity to Montana's constitutional equal rights provision should have mandated divestment.
Montana's declaration of human rights is ephemeral when Montana's capital supports known violators of human rights.
Third, the Board of Investments pursues investment strategies
inimical to Montana's economic well-being. In its 1987-1988 Fiscal
Year Report, the Board of Investments proudly announced the investment of 25.3 million dollars of Montana's capital assets in "the
rapidly growing and highly-rewarding" field of leveraged buyouts. 17 The Board invested these funds with a firm that participated in the leveraged buy outs of Stop & Shop, Seaman's Furniture, and Duracell, as well as the bankruptcy proceedings of Texaco. 8 New leveraged buy-out targets included Beatrice, Motel 6,
Owens-Illinois, and Safeway." 9 As the Board observed, shareholders can realize tremendous profits during leveraged buy outs from
the liquidation of company assets usually required to finance the
buy out. 2 0
The dismemberment of a corporation through the sale of assets to finance a buy out certainly realizes short-term gains for
shareholders. As critics have noted, however, these asset sales also
result in plant closures that devastate communities and workers
dependent upon the continuing operations of a corporation for
113. Penner, Investment Implications of South Africa Divestiture: Report to the
Montana Board of Investments (Feb. 8, 1985).
114. Turk, supra note 105, at 1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, supra note 2, at 6.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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their livelihood. 121 From bitter experience with the Anaconda Company, other mining operations, forest product corporations, and
railroads, Montana has learned the cruel effects of plant closures
dictated by outside financial concerns. For Montana to participate
in leveraged buy outs sure to engender such cruel effects is an economically foolish as well as inhumane investment policy. Convention delegates worried about Montanans' propensity to risk longterm devastation in return for short-term profit. The safeguards
the convention wrote into the constitution have failed to curb this
historical cycle, however, as the Board of Investments pursues immediate return on investments without regard for future adverse
effects on Montana workers and communities.
V.

TOWARD A NEW, CONSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT POLICY

Though the convention failed to institutionalize its detailed
investment priorities in the constitution itself, convention philosophy permeates the document sufficiently for Montanans to demand on constitutional grounds that the state radically alter its
investment policies. First, Montanans can assert the progressive elements of the constitution to force meaningful public participation
in state investment decisions. Second, the populist elements of the
document compel repeal of the prudent expert standard so that
popular will and not expert financiers' criteria can determine state
investment policies. Once freed from the anti-democratic prudent
expert standard, Montana's investment program yet requires firm
checks against state conflicts of interest and popular follies endangering trust fund principal. The conservative elements of the constitution provide part of those checks through the assertion that
Montanans hold funds as they do lands, in trust for future generations. Other provisions, such as the constitution's declaration of
human rights, provide further checks against state conflicts of interest. All three branches of Montana state government should
heed these constitutional imperatives when deciding on proposals
to alter the state investment program.
The prudent expert standard has prevented Montanans from
controlling and benefiting from their own capital assets. As a result, Montana's investment portfolio is a picture of a state investing against its own interests and policies. Repeal of the prudent
expert standard likely will not suffice to reinvolve Montanans in
state investment decisions, however. Although Montanans have
121. See Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 866, 876-77 and accompanying notes (1987).
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well-proved their willingness to discuss and often to fight over
most other public policy issues, financial and economic policies remain beyond most people's sense of personal competence. Yet, in
order to vitalize their declared inalienable rights-to "a clean and
healthful environment,... enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties . . . and seeking their safety, health and happiness" 22-Montanans must assert control of their capital resources.
Our constitution already provides the means for democratic control of our state resources. What we need now is the confidence in
ourselves to wield the power over our capital resources that our
constitution provides. To build that self confidence, we must again
reject the tyranny of financial experts and assert our common,
democratic sense.

122.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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